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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial recall threatens to abolish the independence of the 
judiciary.1  These constitutional provisions set a dangerous precedent 
and will have an adverse effect on merciful sentencing in criminal cases.2  
In California, such a case exemplified these trepidations and ignited a 
fierce debate.3  In 2017, a petition circulated in Santa Clara County for 
the recall of Judge Aaron Persky, a presiding judge for the past thirteen 
years, regarding his grossly lenient, albeit lawful, sentencing in the 
sexual assault case involving ex-Stanford swimmer Brock Turner.4  The 
recall was placed on the June 2018 ballot, where Judge Persky was 
subsequently recalled.5 
First, this Note will trace the historical development of judicial 
recall, along with other mechanisms for policing the judiciary.  Second, 
this Note will identify the problem in California’s Constitution: that 
permitting citizens to recall judges will allow political pressure to 
influence judges’ sentencing decisions, thereby, abolishing the 
independence of California’s judiciary.  Third, this Note will explore 
why the current mechanisms for policing judges are adequate, as 
supported by empirical studies, thus demonstrating why judicial recall is 
unnecessary and its debilitating effects on an independent judiciary, the 
poor, and people of color.  Finally, to preserve judicial independence in 
California, this Note proposes a solution and lays out a model 
amendment eliminating judges from being subject to recall, by 
barrowing underlying logic from states that do not provide judicial 
recall. 
The goal of this Note is to emphasize why state constitutions 
permitting judicial recall will abolish the independence of the judiciary 
and set a dangerous precedent for criminal sentencing. Additionally, the 
Note utilizes the California case People v. Turner,6 where Judge Aaron 
Persky administered the sentencing decision, as a focal point for 
highlighting these issues.   
 
 1. LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, Why the Recall of Judge Persky is Terrible for Racial 
Justice, JUDGECORDELL.COM, http://judgecordell.com (Sept. 23, 2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO,  https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/06/05/617071359/voters-are-
deciding-whether-to-recall-aaron-persky-judge-who-sentenced-brock-tur (Nov. 4, 2018). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Sentencing Memorandum, People v. Turner (No. B1577162). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Direct Democracy 
The Progressive Era saw the emergence of direct democracy as a 
mechanism for American citizens to directly participate in the political 
process.7  The Progressive movement’s general theme was to “restore a 
type of economic individualism and political democracy that was widely 
believed to have existed earlier in America and to have been destroyed 
by corporations and the corrupt party machines.”8  The Progressives 
were  committed to transforming America’s social, economic, and 
political climate.9  In sum, they sought to use direct democracy as a 
means “to remedy the socioeconomic and cultural ills” afflicting the 
country during this era.10 
   To achieve social reform, the Progressives felt they needed a new 
political system, separate from the one they inherited.11  All Progressives 
recognized the initiative, referendum, and recall as means toward 
“removing the corrupting influences which straightjacketed the political 
system into acquiescence to the social afflictions accompanying 
industrialization.”12 
Direct democracy only applies in states that have chosen to adopt it 
as part of the state constitution.13  “The initiative is a process that enables 
citizens to bypass their state legislature by placing proposed statutes and, 
in some states, constitutional amendments on the ballot” for 
amendment.14  The referendum “allows the public to vote on laws passed 
by the legislature before they become effective.”15  The recall is a 
procedure that allows citizens to remove and replace local and public 
officials before the end of their term of office.16  The United States 
Constitution does not provide for recall of any federally elected 
 
 7. Nathanial A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the 
Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. & POL’Y REV. 
11, 18 (1997). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Persily, supra note 7, at 22. 
 10. Id. at 23. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Persily, supra note 7, at 24. 
 13. See generally Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Rebecca White Berch, Megan K. Scanlon & Jared L Sutton, The Centennial of 
Arizona’s Constitution: Celebrating the Centennial: A Century of Arizona Supreme Court 
Constitutional Interpretation, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 468, 488 (2012). 
 16. Initiative, Referendum and Recall, supra note 13. 
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official.17  Unlike the recall, which is a political device, impeachment is 
the legal process of removing an elected official from office.18  Further, 
impeachment distinguishes itself from recall, because it generally 
requires that a government official commit a named crime.19 
Seeing direct democracy as a threat to corporate interests, Pacific 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company challenged the 
constitutionality of the initiative process itself, and eventually argued it 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging that it violated the “Guarantee 
Clause”20 of the U.S. Constitution.21  The Court “rejected the company’s 
argument and reemphasized the history of precedent, declaring the 
Guarantee Clause to be a non-justiciable political question to be 
answered only by the political branches.”22  Thus, the decision erased 
any doubt as to whether direct democracy was constitutional.23 
Although direct democracy is constitutional, these same democratic 
devises that originated as tools for the majority to uproot corporate 
interests have now evolved into mechanisms used by similar 
corporations and interest groups to attain their interests.24  Corporations 
and interest groups quickly learned to use direct democracy to their 
advantage.25 
In recent years, “liberals, conservatives, politicians, and citizens” 
have utilized the ballot to enact proposals they believe are being 
insufficiently addressed through the legislative process, and to resolve 
highly publicized political issues.26  This use of direct democracy has 
created an initiative industry for collecting signatures, promoting 
measures, and attaining interests.27  Additionally, direct democracy has 
manifested itself as a means for politicians and interest groups to 
manipulate the political process by permitting them to frame political 
 
 17. Tom Murse, Can You Recall a Member of Congress?, THOUGHT CO. (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/can-members-of-congress-be-recalled-3368240. 
 18. Recall of State Officials, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 8, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials.aspx. 
 19. Persily, supra note 7, at 14. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and 
on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) 
against domestic violence.”). 
 21. Persily, supra note 7, at 32 (citing Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Or., 223 U.S. 118 
(1912)). 
 22. Id. at 32 (citing Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 142-43). 
 23. Id. at 32. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 37. 
 26. Id. at 38. 
 27. Persily, supra note 7, at 38. 
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issues.28  However, California recall is unique, in that it provides its 
citizens with broad power to recall officials.29 
B. History and Process of California Recall 
Under the California Constitution, the Legislature possesses the 
power to provide recall of local officials.30  Using this power, the 
Legislature drafted the recall provision, which grants citizens the power 
to remove state and local officials.31   
The citizens of California adopted the recall provision as part of the 
California Constitution in 1911.32  State trial court judges, unlike federal 
court judges, judges of the state court of appeal, and state Supreme Court 
justices, are listed as local officials and are subject to recall under local 
official standards enumerated within the California Constitution.33  The 
standards required to initiate the recall of a local official are considerably 
lesser than those required to recall a state official.34  The California 
constitution does not require specified grounds to recall a local official.35  
Although the recall of judges has been a rare event, California had 
previously recalled three superior court judges in 1932.36  Most recently, 
California recalled Governor Gray Davis in 2003.37   
The California Constitution prescribes the requirements for recall 
of local officials.38  The recall process consists of a two-step petition and 
voting process: (1) the citizen recommending the action circulates a 
petition to obtain enough signatures to place the issue on the ballot, and 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“Recall is the power of the electors to remove an elective 
officer.”). 
 30. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 19 (“The Legislature shall provide for recall of local officers. 
This section does not affect counties and cities whose charters provide for recall.”). 
 31. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13. 
 32. California Constitution Center, What Does California’s Experience With Recall of 
Judges Teach Us?, SCOCA BLOG (Nov. 10, 2016), http://scocablog.com/what-does-
californias-experience-with-recall-of-judges-teach-us/#_ftn27. 
 33. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b) (“A petition to recall a statewide officer must be signed 
by electors equal in number to 12 percent of the last vote for the office, with signatures from 
each of 5 counties equal in number to 1 percent of the last vote for the office in the county. 
Signatures to recall Senators, members of the Assembly, members of the Board of 
Equalization, and judges of courts of appeal and trial courts must equal in number 20 percent 
of the last vote for the office.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a) (“Recall of a state officer is initiated by delivering to the 
Secretary of State a petition alleging reason for recall. Sufficiency of reason is not reviewable. 
Proponents have 160 days to file signed petitions.”). 
 36. California Constitution Center, supra note 32, at n.27 (citing Wilbank J. Roche, 
Judicial Discipline in California: A Critical Re-Evaluation, 10 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 192 (1976)) 
(discussing 1932 recall of Los Angeles Superior Court judges John L. Fleming, Dailey S. 
Stafford, and Walter Guerin).   
 37. California Constitution Center, supra note 32. 
 38. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14 subsections (a) through (c) lay out this framework. 
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(2) if sufficient signatures are collected and certified (in California the 
sufficient amount being twenty percent of the last vote for the office39), 
the issue is placed on the ballot for a vote.40  If the citizens vote in favor 
to recall the official, the official will be removed from office before the 
end of his or her term and a replacement official (the candidate listed on 
the ballot who received the most votes) will fill the position.41 
C. Mechanisms to Police Judges in California 
California currently possesses three mechanisms to police judges:  
the Commission on Judicial Performance,42 impeachment,43 and recall.44  
Additionally, because trial court judges are elected officials, it could be 
said that a fourth mechanism for policing exists in the form of retention 
elections.45  These elections are held every six years and allow voters to 
decide whether to re-elect a judge for another term in office.46 
1. Commission on Judicial Performance 
The Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) was established by 
legislative constitutional amendment approved by voters in 1960.47  The 
CJP is an “independent state agency responsible for investigating 
complaints of judicial misconduct, judicial incapacity, and for 
disciplining judges, pursuant to the California Constitution.”48   
The CJP consists of one judge of a court of appeal and two superior 
court judges.49  It also consists of two members of the state bar of 
California who have practiced in the state for ten years, and six citizens 
who are not judges, retired judges, or members of the state bar.50  Finally, 
CJP members are eligible to serve a maximum of two four-year terms or 
a total of ten years, if appointed to fill a vacancy.51 
 
 39. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b). 
 40. Berch, Scanlon & Sutton, supra note 15, at 488. 
 41. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15(c) (“If the majority vote on the question is to recall, the 
officer is removed and, if there is a candidate, the candidate who receives a plurality is the 
successor. The officer may not be a candidate, nor shall there be any candidacy for an office 
filled pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 16 of Article VI.”). 
 42. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8. 
 43. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18. 
 44. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14. 
 45. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16. 
 46. Id. Subsection (c) reads terms of judges of superior courts are six years beginning the 
Monday after January 1 following their election. 
 47. Commission on Judicial Performance, C.A. GOV’T, 
https://cjp.ca.gov/legal_authority/. 
 48. Commission on Judicial Performance, C.A. GOV’T, https://cjp.ca.gov. See also CAL. 
CONST. art. VI, § 18; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18.1; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18.5. 
 49. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8(a). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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Pursuant to the California Constitution, the CJP has the authority to 
make rules for the investigation and formal proceedings against judges.52  
These rules are referred to as the Rules of the Commission on Judicial 
Performance.53  In relevant part, one provision of the Rules of the CJP 
sets out the standard of review and standards for removal pertaining to 
legal error:   
[d]iscipline . . . shall not be imposed for mere legal error without 
more.  However, a judge who commits legal error in which, in 
addition, clearly and convincingly reflects bad faith, bias, abuse of 
authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard of 
the law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial 
duty is subject to investigation and discipline.54 
Additionally, the California Constitution grants the California 
Supreme Court the power to make rules for the conduct of judges, both 
on and off the bench, referred to as the Code of Judicial Ethics.55  This 
code serves as an ethical guideline, to which judges must abide.56  It also 
serves as a tool for the CJP to use during its investigation, along with 
other laws.57  Finally, after concluding an investigation, the CJP may 
submit a petition and recommendation to the Supreme Court for the 
removal of a judge.58  Upon submission, the Supreme Court reviews 
investigation and recommendation, and determines whether the judge 
will be removed.59 
2. California Impeachment 
As mentioned above, impeachment is a legal process.60  The 
California Constitution authorizes the power to impeach solely within 
the Assembly.61  The Senate tries impeachment trials.62  Judges of state 
courts are subject to impeachment for misconduct in office.63  Judgment 
may extend only to removal from office and disqualification to hold any 
 
 52. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18. See also Commission on Judicial Performance, supra note 
47. 
 53. Rules of the Commission on Judicial Discipline, https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/2017/08/CJP_Rules.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(m). 
 56. Id. 
 57. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18. 
 58. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(d). 
 59. Id. However, if the Supreme Court has not acted within 120 days after granting the 
petition, the decision of the commission shall be final. 
 60. Recall of State Officials, supra note 18. 
 61. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a). 
 62. Id. 
 63. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18(b). 
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office under the State, however, the person convicted remains subject to 
criminal punishment according to law.64 
D. Judicial Independence 
One of the core values of our democracy is judicial independence.65  
“It is based upon the principal that each case should be decided on its 
particular facts and applicable law rather than in response to political 
considerations or public opinion.”66  The Founding Fathers and the 
Framers adopted the theory of an independent judiciary during the 
conception and ratification of the U.S. Constitution.67  Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution is the crux of judicial independence and provides that 
federal judges may be appointed for life terms and that the legislative 
and executive branches may not combine to punish judges.68 
Alexander Hamilton, a Framer of the U.S. Constitution, offered 
justification for an independent judiciary in the 78th paper of “The 
Federalist.”69 Hamilton argued that “there is no liberty, if the power of 
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”70  
Further, he explained that “[t]he complete independence of the courts of 
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”71  By this, 
Hamilton meant that only an independent judicial branch of government 
would be able to impartially check an excessive exercise of power by the 
other branches of government.72  Thus, the judiciary would guard the 
rule of law in a constitutional democracy.73 
E. Arguments Regarding the Recall of Judge Aaron Persky 
In California, the recall petition for Judge Aaron Persky has sparked 
a fierce debate regarding the recall’s effects on California’s independent 
judiciary.  Additionally, Nevada and Utah’s approach to judicial recall 
will be discussed in contrast to California’s to support the position that 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. SUP. CT. OF CAL. CTY. OF SANTA CLARA RETIRED JUDICIAL OFFICERS, Open Letter 
on the Need for Judicial Independence, http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca/SCC-Retired-Judges-
Open-Letter.pdf.   
 66. Id. 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall 
hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a 
compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”). 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 69. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. John Patrick, Judicial Independence, ANNENBERG CLASSROOM, 
http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/term/judicial-independence. 
 73. Id. 
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the recall mechanism is unnecessary and threatens to abrogate the 
independence of the judiciary.74 
1. Arguments Opposing Judicial Recall 
Opponents of the recall assert that judicial independence is a 
cornerstone of due process and an essential prerequisite of a fair criminal 
justice system.75  “Judges are entrusted with immense power over the 
life and liberty of criminal defendants from all walks of life, and they 
need latitude to exercise that power judiciously.”76  Moreover, judicial 
recalls over a single lawful judicial ruling threaten our independent 
judiciary and set a dangerous precedent.77  The rationale behind this is 
that “historically and empirically, recall actions push judges towards 
sharply ratcheting up sentences, especially against the poor and people 
of color, out of fear of media campaigns run by well-funded interest 
groups.”78  Through use of the recall mechanism, we risk repeating an 
ugly chapter of California’s history:  when three California Supreme 
Court Justices were recalled for voting  in opposition  to the death 
penalty, despite casting their votes  “in accordance with the dictates of 
justice and the constitution as they understood them.”79  In sum, “judges 
must be able to make decisions without fear of political repercussions.”80 
Showing judicial mercy by granting a “second chance to criminal 
defendants is a delicate decision that requires courage on part of the 
judges.”81  The CJP investigated the allegations against Judge Persky and 
rejected the claims of bias, finding that he followed the law and the Santa 
Clara County Probation Department’s recommendation.82   
A “proper sentence that punishes and rehabilitates is not something 
that should be subject to popular vote.”83  As stated by Judge LaDoris 
Cordell, “[s]hould the recall succeed, the independence of the California 
 
 74. See infra Section II.E.3. 
 75. Open Letter on the Need for Judicial Independence, supra note 65. 
 76. Stanford Law School Graduates Submit Letter to Reconsider Recall Effort of Judge 
Persky, A.C. JUST. PROJECT, https://acjusticeproject.org/2016/06/22/stanford-law-school-
graduates-submit-letter-to-reconsider-recall-effort-of-judge-persky/. 
 77. Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, supra note 3. 
 78. Law Professors’ Statement for the Independence of the Judiciary and Against the 
Recall of Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 15, 
2017),  http://www.sfchronicle.com/file/232/4/2324-
89%20names%20Law%20Professors%20Statement.pdf. 
 79. Stanford Law School Graduates Submit Letter to Reconsider Recall Effort of Judge 
Persky, supra note 76. 
 80. Open Letter on the Need for Judicial Independence, supra note 65. 
 81. Stanford Law School Graduates Submit Letter to Reconsider Recall Effort of Judge 
Persky, supra note 76. 
 82. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, 
supra note 3. 
 83. Cordell, supra note 1. 
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judiciary and the integrity of lawful, albeit sometimes unpopular rulings 
by judges will be forever compromised.”84  “Judges must have the ability 
to exercise their discretion, especially when it comes to sentencing.”85  
The predominant fear is that if voter-initiated recalls based upon 
unpopular rulings by judges become the precedent, judges will impose 
mandatory sentences without consideration for a defendant’s individual 
circumstances.86  To support their assertions, the opposition cites several 
studies which indicate that the imposition of mandatory sentencing will 
have a disproportionately large effect on the poor and people of color.87  
All of these concerns highlight the need for an independent judiciary; 
one that is unbiased and considers a defendant’s circumstances when 
determining a sentence under the law, rather than predicating a sentence 
upon the fear of being recalled. 
2. Arguments Supporting Judicial Recall 
Proponents of the recall propose that citizens must have the power 
to directly police the judiciary, because judges “exercise political power, 
and therefore, may act for corrupt and improper reasons.”88  
Additionally, complaints sent to the CJP are subject to a biased, 
erroneous proceeding, conducted by an agency that has a history of 
protecting judges.89  Recall is a constant threat, which makes judges 
continuously accountable for their actions.90 Holding judges accountable 
through recall is a legitimate exercise of democratic accountability.91  
Recall does not affect judicial independence, because it is simply an 
early retention election.92  “In a retention election, voters may consider 
information about a judge’s performance of his duties when casting their 
ballots.”93  The recall is no different, as it is merely an alternative to a 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Emi Young & Akiva Freidlin, Race, Privilege, and Recall: Why the Misleading 
Campaign Against the Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner Will Only Make Our System Less 
Fair, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2016), https://medium.com/@recalljustice/race-privilege-and-
recall-d0658c8d04ea.   
 88. Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: Top Ten Constitutional 
Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 939 n.58 (2004) 
(explaining the argument in support of including judges within recall statutes). 
 89. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, 
supra note 3. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Tracey Kaplan, Opponents of Recalling Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky Stress 
Judicial Independence, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/10/12/opponents-of-recalling-judge-stress-judicial-
independence/. 
 92. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, 
supra note 3. 
 93. Id. 
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traditional election.94  It is up to the voters to determine whether or not 
the judge continues in office and the voters may consider the judge’s 
history on the bench, including his decisions, in making their 
determinations.95 
Further, because the judiciary was created to serve the public, the 
people should have the right to remove members who fail to carry out  
their duties.96  Thus, the retention election and the recall are similar 
devices which permit the public to decide whether to remove a judge 
from the bench.97   
Finally, because it is the citizen’s right to initiate a recall, it follows, 
then, that it is the electorate that should determine the merit of that reason 
as grounds for removal, not the court.98  Through this process, the reason 
behind voters initiating the recall “presents a political issue for resolution 
by vote, and not a legal question for court decision.”99  The process 
grants citizens direct participation in policing the judiciary and provides 
a tool to attain equal justice.100   
3. Judicial Recall in Other States 
Recently, Nevada voters accused a municipal court judge of 
injudicious conduct and initiated a recall petition for her removal from 
office.101  Seeking an injunction, the judge sued, arguing that judges are 
not subject to recall under the Nevada Constitution.102  Nevada’s 
Supreme Court held that citizens may elect judges, but they may not 
recall them from office.103   
The Nevada voters approved the creation of the Commission on 
Judicial Discipline (CJD) “through a constitutional amendment to 
provide for a standardized system of judicial governance.”104  The 
“amendment provides for the removal of judges from office as a form of 
 
 94. Recall Aaron Persky (FAQ), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171231032027/http://www.recallaaronpersky.com/factsheet 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
 95. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, 
supra note 3. 
 96. Ramsey v. City of North Las Vegas, 392 P.3d 614, 624 (2017) (Pickering J., Douglas 
J. dissenting). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 627. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, 
supra note 3. 
 101. Steve Sebelius, Nevada Supreme Court rules Silver State Judges Can’t Be Recalled 
From Office, L.V. REV. J., https://www.reviewjournal.com/steve-sebelius/nevada-supreme-
court-rules-silver-state-judges-cant-be-recalled-from-office/. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at  622. 
 104. Id. at 615-16. 
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discipline.”105  The argument posed to the court was that even if judges 
originally could be recalled, the creation of the CJD repealed any such 
prior recall authority vested in citizens over judges.106   
The court began by analyzing the Legislature’s intent for creating 
the CJD.107  Intending to promote an independent judiciary, the 
Legislature believed that the CJD would be in a better position than 
voters to evaluate the performance of a judge and recommend corrective 
action.108 
The court analyzed the language contained within the constitutional 
provision and held that the omission of an express intent to maintain the 
citizen’s recall power over judges was evidence of the Legislature’s 
intent to supplant other forms of judicial removal, except legislative 
impeachment.109  Further, permitting voters to recall judges because of 
an unpopular decision, and not because of incompetence, subjects judges 
to political influence when rendering their decisions.110 
Finally, the court held that judges were not subject to recall because 
of:  (1) the legislative history, (2) the order in which the constitutional 
provisions were enacted, and (3) the importance of insulating the judicial 
branch from political influences; a prerogative that cannot be 
accomplished if voter recall of judges is interpreted to have not been 
repealed by the creation of the CJD.111 
Similarly, Utah’s constitution does not provide citizens with the 
power to remove judges through recall.112  Like Nevada, Utah limits its 
methods of removing judges to retention elections, legislative 
impeachment, or removal recommendations by the Judicial Conduct 
Commission (JCC) to the Utah Supreme Court.113  Moreover, because 
citizens submit complaints for the JCC to investigate, they have a direct 
role in policing the judiciary.114  Utah has yet to determine whether these 
methods of policing judges are inadequate, 115 thereby lending credence 
to the notion that despite opinions to the contrary, the ability to recall 
judges is not an essential political devise. 
 
 105. Id. at 616. 
 106. Id. at 617. 
 107. Id. at 618. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 619-22. 
 110. Id. at 624. 
 111. Id. at 622. 
 112. Timothy Pack, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Removing Public Officials from 
Office in Utah and the Case for Recall, UTAH L. REV. 665, 665 (2008). 
 113. Id. at 667-68. The JCC may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or 
involuntary retirement of any justice or judge, however, before implementing any JCC order, 
the Utah Supreme Court will review the JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact. 
 114. Id. at 669. 
 115. Id. at 665. 
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III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
The California Constitution’s citizens recall provision is an 
insufficient mechanism to police the judiciary.116  Currently, the 
constitution contains no provision stating grounds for which judges may 
be removed.117  This language is overbroad because it gives citizens the 
power to recall a judge who makes one lawful, albeit unpopular 
decision.118  Surely this is not what the Legislature had intended when 
granting citizens the power to recall judges.   
Further, subjecting judges to recall entangles politics with 
California’s independent judiciary.119  Empirical studies have 
demonstrated that judges who are subject to being voted out of office 
allow political pressure to influence their sentencing decisions.120  
Judges’ ability to remain impartial is nullified if they have to test the 
winds in fear of igniting public outrage before rendering a decision.121  
Finally, the evidence suggests that this overbroad power not only 
abolishes an independent judiciary, but also results in harsher sentencing 
for the poor and people of color.122  The critical issue set forth is that the 
current California constitutional provision subjecting judges to citizen 
recall threatens to abolish the independence of the judiciary, and is 
therefore an insufficient mechanism to police judges. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. California’s Commission on Judicial Performance Explanatory 
Statement 
Although proponents of judicial recall contend that the CJP is 
corrupt and biased in favor of judges,123 the process in which it 
investigates allegations of misconduct is quite complex and impartial.124  
In the Turner case, Judge Aaron Persky sentenced Brock Turner to “six 
months in county jail plus three years of probation and lifetime sex 
 
 116. See generally Cordell, supra note 1. 
 117. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a). 
 118. Cordell, supra note 1. 
 119. Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, supra note 3. 




 121. Cordell, supra note 1. 
 122. Young & Freidlin, supra note 87. 
 123. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, 
supra note 3. 
 124. See generally Comm’n on Jud. Performance, Commission On Judicial Performance 
Closes Investigation of Judge Aaron Persky, C.A. GOV’T, https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/2016/08/Persky_Explanatory_Statement_12-19-16.pdf. 
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offender registration.”125  The sentencing decision was widely criticized 
as being too lenient, and triggered significant media coverage and public 
outrage.126  In response to the outrage, the CJP issued an explanatory 
statement pursuant to the California Constitution.127 
The complaints submitted to the CJP primarily “alleged that: 
(1) Judge Persky abused his authority and displayed bias in his 
sentencing of Turner; 
(2) the sentence was unlawful; 
(3) the judge displayed gender bias and failed to take sexual assault 
of women seriously; 
(4) the judge exhibited racial and/or socioeconomic bias because a 
non-white or less privileged defendant would have received a 
harsher sentence; and 
(5) the judge’s history as a student-athlete at Stanford University 
caused him to be biased in favor of Turner and that he should have 
disclosed his Stanford affiliation or disqualified himself from 
handling the case.”128   
Regarding the unlawful sentencing complaint, the CJP determined 
that the sentence was within the parameters set by the Penal Code,129 and 
was therefore lawful.130  The transcript of the Turner sentencing hearing 
reflects the judge’s finding that “Turner’s youth and lack of a significant 
record reduced his culpability, thereby overcoming the statutory 
limitation on probation.”131  The transcript also reflects the judge’s 
consideration of the factors that the rules require a court to consider to 
determine whether probation is appropriate instead of a state prison 
sentence.132 
 
 125. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE,  Commission On Judicial Performance 
Closes Investigation of Judge Aaron Persky, https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/2016/08/Persky_Explanatory_Statement_12-19-16.pdf. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. The CJP’s statement was made pursuant to CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(k). 
 128. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125. 
 129. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.065(b) (“Except in unusual cases where the interests of 
justice would best be served if the person is granted probation, probation shall not be granted 
to a person who violates various other subsections relating to sexual offenses or is convicted 
of assault with intent to commit a specified sexual offense.”).   
 130. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (“Factors include: the nature; seriousness; and circumstances of the crime as 
compared to other instances of the same crime; the vulnerability of the victim; whether the 
defendant inflicted physical or emotional injury; whether the defendant was an active 
participant in the crime; whether the defendant demonstrated criminal sophistication; the 
defendant’s prior criminal record; the defendant’s willingness and ability to comply with the 
terms of probation; the likely effect of imprisonment on the defendant; the adverse collateral 
consequences on the defendant from the felony conviction; whether the defendant is 
remorseful; and whether or not the defendant was likely be a danger to others.”). 
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Next, the CJP addressed an additional complaint that the judge’s 
sentencing decision, based in part on Turner’s youth, level of 
intoxication, and remorse, constituted judicial bias, and thus, an abuse of 
his discretion.133  The CJP determined that “[e]ven if it were improper 
for the judge to assess those factors as he did, those issues are properly 
addressed on appeal.”134  Under the Code of Judicial Ethics, “[a] judicial 
decision or administrative act later determined to be incorrect legally is 
not itself a violation of this code.”135  Further, under the standard set by 
the California Supreme Court, even if the judge failed to follow a statute 
or abused his discretion, the CJP cannot impose discipline unless the 
error “clearly and convincingly reflect[ed] bad faith, bias, abuse of 
authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard of the 
law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty.”136   
“The presence or absence of judicial bias has been established in 
some cases by examining whether a judge’s remarks or conduct reflected 
bias.”137  “Bias has also been assessed in some instances by examining 
decisions in other similar cases.”138 
“A judge’s comments during sentencing are one type of in court 
statement that commissions and courts are hesitant to subject to 
discipline; a reluctance based on concern that sanctions would 
discourage judges from articulating the bases for their sentencing 
decisions.”139  Regarding Judge Persky’s remarks during the sentencing 
hearing, when granting probation for certain sex offenses under the Penal 
Code,140 judges must explain  on the record why granting probation 
would be in  the interests of justice.141  This can be demonstrated through 
an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the case.142  Moreover, 
judges must also state the primary factor(s) that support their decision to 
grant probation.143 
One complainant contended that “the judge’s remark at the Turner 
sentencing hearing that Turner ‘will not be a danger to others’ reflected 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. CAL. JUD. ETHICS CODE, Cannon 1. 
 136. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125 (quoting Oberholzer v. 
Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 20 Cal. 4th 371, 395-99 (1999)). 
 137. Id. (quoting In re Glickfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 891 (1971)). 
 138. Id. (quoting In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 139. Id. at n.5 (quoting Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: 
Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245 (2004)). 
 140. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.065(b). 
 141. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 7 (citing CAL. RULES OF 
COURT, R. 4.406). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 4.406(b)). 
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bias.”144  However, as the CJP’s statement noted “future dangerousness 
is one of the factors that a judge must consider when deciding whether 
to grant or deny probation.”145  Further, the remark derived from the 
results of two clinical tests, contained within the probation report, which 
predicted whether Turner would be dangerous in the future.146   
Another complainant contended that Judge Persky’s remark 
regarding the severe impact a prison sentence would have on Turner 
reflected his bias. 147  However, in determining whether probation is 
appropriate, “the likely impact of imprisonment on the defendant” is a 
relevant factor  to which the judge must consider.148 
Finally, the allegation that Judge Persky abused his discretion by 
engaging in judicial bias  is unsupported by the transcript from the 
sentencing hearing, as there was no evidence that Turner’s race, 
socioeconomic status, university affiliation, or student athlete status 
were implicitly referenced when Judge Persky made his remarks.149  Nor 
did the transcript support the notion  that Judge Persky considered the 
victim’s damages in a subjective manner or that he lacked sympathy for 
her.150   
In sum, the CJP concluded that neither judge Persky’s statements 
regarding Turner, nor any other remarks made by him during the 
sentencing hearing constituted clear and convincing evidence of judicial 
bias.151 
The Commission also provided examples of cases where it found 
judges statements to reflect bias, in stark contrast to the instant case.152  
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 4.414(b)(8)). 
 146. Id. (“The probation department evaluated Turner’s dangerousness using two 
assessment tools and advised in its report that he was not very likely to re-offend due to 
receiving a score of 3 on the Static-99R, an actuarial measure of sexual offense recidivism, 
which placed him in the low-moderate risk category for being charged or convicted of another 
sexual offense; further the Probation Department validated the previous finding by assessing 
Turner using the Corrections Assessment Intervention System, a standardized, validated 
assessment and case management system developed by the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency which assesses a defendant’s criminogenic needs and risk to re-offend.”). 
 147. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 7. 
 148. Id. (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 4.414(b)(5)). Judge Persky “acknowledged that 
state prison is likely to have a severe impact on a defendant ‘in any case,’ and, he explained, 
‘I think it’s probably more true with a youthful offender sentenced to state prison at a young 
age.’ ”  Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. Judge Persky acknowledged that with respect to the vulnerability of the victim, 
the victim in this case was extremely vulnerable. Further, he acknowledged that it was an 
element of counts two and three of the crime Turner was charged with, but not count one. 
Finally, Judge Persky explained that the element obviously weighed in favor of denying 
probation. Id. at 4. 
 151. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 7. 
 152. Id. 
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In People v. Beasley,153 the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial 
court’s order of probation and dismissal of various rape, robbery, and 
kidnapping charges.154  “In open court, the judge referred to the victim 
as the ‘alleged victim’ and ridiculed the police inspector who 
accompanied her to the defendants’ probation hearing and his superior 
officer who had instructed the inspector to accompany the victim to 
court.”155  The court found that the judge’s “incomprehensible tirade” 
constituted judicial bias against the victim and the accompanying 
officers.156  The California Supreme Court censured the judge one year 
after the Beasley case was decided.157  The Commission’s 
recommendation for discipline was based on the remarks referred to in 
the appellate decision, the judge insulting the victim, and his intemperate 
remarks in open court.158 
More recently, in 2012, the Commission publicly admonished a 
judge for making remarks at a sentencing hearing in a rape case that 
created the impression that he was biased against victims who did not 
suffer serious bodily injury demonstrating a struggle.159   
Other criminal cases handled by Judge Persky have also been 
pointed out “as proof of his bias in favor of white and/or privileged male 
defendants, particularly college athletes, and/or of his failure to take 
violence against women seriously.”160  The explanatory statement of the 
investigation references each of these cases and explains why the 
sentencing determinations were lawful.161 
In People v. Ramirez, Ramirez  sexually assaulted his female 
roommate.162  In a negotiated deal through counsel, Ramirez received a 
three-year sentence163 in exchange for a guilty plea.  There are some 
allegations, based upon a  comparison between  Ramirez’s sentence and  
Turner’s lighter sentence, which contend that Ramirez’s Salvadorian 
heritage was  the explanation for the disparity in sentencing decisions.164  
 
 153. Id. (citing People v. Beasley, 5 Cal. App. 3d 617 (1970)). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 7-8. 
 156. Id. at 8. 
 157. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 8. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. (citing Public Admonishment of Judge Johnson (2012)). In this instance, “the 
judge relied on his own expert opinion, based on his experience as a prosecutor, saying,  ‘I’m 
not a gynecologist, but I can tell you something: If someone doesn’t want to have sexual 
intercourse, the body shuts down. The body will not permit that to happen unless a lot of 
damage is inflicted . . .’ The judge also said that the case  ‘trivializes a rape,’ was ‘technical,’ 
and was ‘more of a crim law test than a real live criminal case.’ ”  
 160. Id. at 8. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 8. 
 164. Id. 
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However, although Judge Persky presided over  the case’s earlier 
proceedings,  a subsequent judge presided over  Ramirez’ guilty plea.  
“Thus, the Ramirez case cannot be used to demonstrate disparate 
treatment in sentencing by Judge Persky.”165 
In addition, Ramirez’s sentence resulted from  negotiations  
between counsel.166  Finally, the penalty for Ramirez’s plea—to the 
crime of forcible sexual penetration of a conscious or unimpaired 
person—is comprised of a three year state prison statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence.167  “California law explicitly prohibits a downward 
departure for a violation of that penal code section168 under any 
circumstances, whereas the penal code sections Brock Turner was 
convicted of violating169 permitted, at the time,170 a downward departure 
to probation in certain circumstances.”171 
Proponents of judicial recall have also pointed to Judge Persky’s 
sentencing in People v. Chiang, People v. Gunderson, and People v. 
Smith, each of which involved domestic battery charges, and People v. 
Chain, as proof of his bias towards white or privileged defendants or 
those who are college athletes, and as evidence that Judge Persky lacks 
sympathy in cases involving  violence against women.172   
Although judges must review a probation report, the law does not 
require them to follow its recommendations.173  One of the county 
probation department’s primary duties is to assist the court in arriving at 
an appropriate sentence.174 “Judge Persky’s sentencing decisions in the 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 8. 
 167. Cal. Penal Code § 289(a) (“Any person who commits an act of sexual penetration 
when the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress, 
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years.”). 
 168. Id.; Cal. Penal Code § 289(a). 
 169. Id.; Cal. Penal Code §§ 220(a)(1), 289(e), & 289(d). 
 170. Id.; See CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at n.1 (explaining 
that on September 30, 2016, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law Assembly Bill 2888, 
which amended Penal Code § 1203.065 to prohibit courts from granting probation instead of 
a state prison sentence to anyone convicted of Penal Code § 289(d) or § 289(e)); see also 
Jazmine Ulloa, Spurred by Brock Turner Case, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Law to Toughen 
Against Rape, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-
california-sex-crimes-stanford-cosby-bills-20160930-snap-htmlstory.html (describing 
California’s  expansion of mandatory minimum sentences for sex crime cases in greater 
detail). 
 171. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 8. 
 172. Id. at 9.  (citing People v. Chiang (No. B1475227); People v. Gunderson (No. 
B1577341); People v. Smith (No. B1581137); People v. Chain (No. B1473538)).   
 173. Id. at 9; Cal. Penal Code § 1203(b)(3). 
 174. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 9 (quoting People v. 
Villarreal, 65 Cal. App. 3d 938, 945 (1977)) (explaining it is fundamental that the probation 
decision should not turn solely upon the nature of the offense committed, but should be rooted 
in the facts and circumstances of each case). 
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Chiang, Gunderson, and Smith cases resulted from negotiated 
agreements between the defense and the prosecution.”175  “In three of the 
four cases, the judge’s sentencing decisions aligned with the 
recommendations of the probation department.”176  However, the fourth 
case did not involve a probation report. 177 
Thus, because Judge Persky followed all applicable rules, the CJP 
determined that these decisions did not provide clear and convincing 
evidence to support the contention that his decisions reflected personal 
bias in favor of white criminal defendants and/or more privileged 
criminal defendants, nor that he took crimes involving violence against 
women less seriously.178 
Finally, critics have remarked that Judge Persky should have 
recused himself from the Turner case because he and Turner both 
competed in athletics at Stanford University.179  They argue that at the 
very least, the judge should be required to disclose his connection with 
the university.180 
The Code of Civil Procedure181 (CCP) articulates the circumstances 
which require  disqualification of a member of the judiciary.182  The CCP 
“states that a judge shall be disqualified if [f]or any reason [a] person 
aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge 
would be able to be impartial.”183  The Code of Judicial Ethics “requires 
judges to disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant 
to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no 
basis for disqualification.”184 
The commission cited Cline v. Sawyer,185 as an example of a court 
denying a party’s disqualification challenge to a judge, which was 
premised upon the fact that the judge and the respondents attended the 
same university.186  The court noted: 
[t]he affidavit alleges that the judge and [respondents] attended the 
same university at the same time where ‘they may have’ belonged to 
 
 175. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 9. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 10. 
 180. Id. 
 181. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 10; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§ 170.1. 
 182. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 10. 
 183. Id.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii). 
 184. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 10; CAL. JUD. ETHICS 
CODE, Cannon 3E(2). 
 185. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 11 (quoting Cline v. 
Sawyer, 600 P. 2d 725 (Wyo. 1979)). 
 186. Id. 
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the same fraternities or associations.  Certainly . . .  [i]t does not 
reflect a leaning of his mind in favor of [respondents] to the extent 
that it will sway his judgment or to the extent that he would make his 
decisions in the matter other than on the evidence placed before 
him.187 
The CJP concluded that Judge Persky’s connections to Stanford 
University were not of the kind to which disclosure or recusal would 
have been required under the law.188  Further, the ties were insufficient 
to establish his alleged failure to act impartially, in favor of Turner or 
other Stanford-affiliated litigants.189 
In sum, “[a]n independent, impartial, and honorable judiciary is 
indispensable to justice in our society.”190  “An independent judge is one 
who is able to rule as he or she determines appropriate, without fear of 
jeopardy or punishment.”191  “So long as the judge makes rulings in good 
faith, and in an effort to follow the law as the judge understands it, the 
usual safeguard against error or overreaching lies in the adversary 
system and appellate review.”192  The CJP concluded by stating it did not 
find clear and convincing evidence of injudicious conduct by Judge 
Persky.193 
Although there are allegations of the CJP being biased in favor of 
protecting judges,194 its explanatory statement regarding the procedural 
process through which it analyzed the complaints against Judge Persky 
highlights its impartiality.  All conclusions contained in the statement 
are supported by law and distinguish judicious conduct from injudicious 
conduct.  Moreover, “since 2005, the CJP has removed six judges for 
misconduct.”195  Thus, the explanatory statement demonstrates that the 
CJP is an adequate mechanism to allow citizens to participate in the 
political process and police the judiciary, without the need for subjecting 
judges recall.  Other states have created commissions similar to the CJP 
to eliminate political pressures from influencing judges’ decisions, 
thereby, preserving their ability to remain impartial and maintaining the 
independence of the judiciary.196   
 
 187. Id. 
 188. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 11. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. (quoting Cannon 1 of the California Code of Judicial Ethics). 
 191. Id. 
 192. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 12. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See generally Recall Aaron Persky (FAQ), (last visited Mar. 21, 2019) 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171231032027/http://www.recallaaronpersky.com/factsheet 
 195. LaDoris Cordell, Cordell: Do Not Recall Persky Over Brock Turner-Stanford Case, 
MERCURY NEWS (June 23, 2016), https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/06/23/cordell-do-
not-recall-persky-over-brock-turner-stanford-case/. 
 196. See infra Section IV.B. 
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B. Analysis of Judicial Recall in Other States 
In Ramsey v. North Las Vegas, the Supreme Court of Nevada 
rendered its decision based upon statutory interpretation.197  Recognizing 
that judges were public officers and subject to recall under an existing 
constitutional provision,198 the court looked to the language of the newer 
enactment to determine whether it gave the CJD exclusive authority to 
remove judges.199  If so, the previous provision would be abrogated.200   
Looking at the specific language contained within the statute 
creating the CJD, the court noted that the inclusion of impeachment and 
removal by the CJD were exclusive methods to remove a judge, thereby 
excluding recall.201  In its holding, the court relied on the theory of 
statutory interpretation that states the expression of one thing is the 
exclusion of another,202 and thus, the methods provided in the new 
enactment were exclusive and repealed any existing statutes reserving 
the power of recall to Nevada citizens.203   
In addition, the court explained that “[w]hereas the Commission’s 
purpose is to be consistent, public opinion rarely is; instead, conduct that 
may yield a recall in one district may not do the same in another.”204  The 
court continued, explaining “[t]he dissent correctly points out that recall 
is unique because it allows voters to initiate removal for cause they alone 
decide.205  Such a result is precisely what the creation of the Commission 
was intended to avoid.”206  Like Nevada, Utah does not allow citizens to 
recall judges.207  Its Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the JCC  is 
an adequate mechanism to participate  police the judiciary.208 
Thus, Nevada, Utah, and many other states209 have refrained from 
subjecting judges to recall, recognizing the chilling effect it has on 
 
 197. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 622. 
 198. NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 9 (providing in relevant part, every public officer in the State 
of Nevada is subject to recall from office by the registered voters of the state, or of the county, 
district, or municipality which he represents). 
 199. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 619. 
 200. Id. 
 201. NEV. CONST. art. 6, §§ 19-21 (providing in relevant part, a justice of the Supreme 
Court, a district judge, a justice of the peace or a municipal judge may, in addition to the 
provision of Article 7 for impeachment, be censured, retired, removed or otherwise disciplined 
by the commission on judicial discipline). 
 202. Although California is not able to use such statutory interpretation, the Nevada court 
used the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning the expressing of one thing is 
the exclusion of another, to interpret the statute creating the CJD.   
 203. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 622. 
 204. Id. at 621. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Pack, supra note 112, at 665. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Recall of State Officials, supra note 18 (explaining that only eight states permit 
judicial recall: Arizona, California, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin permit judicial 
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judicial independence.  Additionally, several in-depth studies analyze 
the effects of political pressures on judges’ sentencing decisions in 
criminal cases, thereby supporting the notion that an independent 
judiciary is necessary for creating equality when sentencing criminal 
defendants.210 
C. Empirical Studies Reveal That Political Pressures Impact Judges’ 
Sentencing Decisions to the Detriment of Criminal Defendants 
“Given the extraordinary power state court judges exercise over the 
liberty, and the lives, of defendants, it is vital that they remain 
impartial.”211  However, increasing amounts of evidence suggest that 
providing citizens with the ability to recall  judges based upon lawful, 
albeit unpopular decisions jeopardizes  judges’ ability to remain 
impartial in criminal cases.212 
Ten prominent empirical studies examining the relationship 
between judicial elections and criminal case outcomes all found that 
political pressures impact judges’ rulings to the detriment of criminal 
defendants.213  The studies found that the threat of recall causes judges 
to (1) sentence more punitively and (2) vote less frequently in favor of 
criminal defendants on appeal.214 
The data reveals that advertisements and other media describing a 
judge’s record on criminal history, has an effect on retention elections 
and on judges’ sentencing decisions.215  For example, a Pennsylvania 
study examining whether retention elections had an effect on judges 
analyzed over 22,000 sentences for aggravated assault, rape, and robbery 
in the 1990s.216  Researchers found that “sentences for these crimes are 
significantly longer the closer the sentencing judge is to standing for 
reelection.”217  Additional research, based upon the crimes analyzed, 
indicated “more than 2,000 years of additional incarceration could be 
 
recall based upon any grounds, while Georgia, Minnesota, and Montana require grounds such 
as malfeasance, misconduct, failure to perform duties of the office, or conviction of a serious 
crime while in office to support a petition for judicial recall). 
 210. See infra Section IV.C. 
 211. How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, supra note 120, at 1. 
 212. See id. at 1. 
 213. Id. at 1. 
 214. Id. at 2. 
 215. Id. at 1 (“To assess the role of criminal cases in judicial elections, this paper considers 
15 years of television advertising data for state supreme court elections, provided by 
CMAG/Kantar Media and analyzed by the Brennan Center for Justice, as well as a series of 
reports synthesizing this data written by the Brennan Center, Justice at Stake, and the National 
Institute on Money in State Politics.”). 
 216. How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, supra note 120, at 7. Researchers 
selected “this class of offense because judges sentencing in these cases always exercise some 
discretion in determining the severity of the punishment and typically assign prison time.” 
 217. Id. 
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attributed to re-election pressures” and fear of being seen as soft on 
crime.218   
Moreover, a separate study made similar findings about the impact 
of re-election pressures and its effect on sentencing in Washington 
State.219  Every four years, Washington’s trial court judges stand for re-
election.220  The researchers relied  on a dataset of 276,119 cases, which 
were heard by 265 judges in the state from 1995 to 2006. 221  The dataset 
revealed that sentences were ten percent longer  when the judge’s 
political cycle neared an end; as opposed to sentences made during the 
beginning of the judge’s political cycle.222  Their study focused on 
assault, murder, rape, and robbery cases.223  In concluding that the 
increased sentences were a direct result of re-election pressure, the 
researchers determined that they could: 
rule out patterns in cyclical sentencing due to factors other than 
politics . . . by examining sentencing by retiring judges, who do not 
face electoral pressure; the sentencing of less serious crimes, about 
which the public (and potential competitors for a judge’s seat) are 
 likely less concerned; and sentencing in nearby Oregon, where 
judges are elected on a different cycle.224 
Finally, a research study recording Kansas trial courts from 1997 to 
2003 considered the effects of political pressures on judges’ sentencing 
decisions.225  “They found that incumbent judges facing competitive re-
election rendered more punitive sentences than judges seeking to keep 
their seats through non-contested retention races.”226  The study analyzed 
a dataset containing 18,139 felonies—focusing on assault, criminal 
threat, robbery, sexual assault, theft, burglary, and arson—which 
revealed that judges imposed longer sentences when faced with an 
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upcoming retention election,  as compared to the sentencing  imposed by 
judges with retention elections occurring at some time in the future.227 
Based upon this analysis, the research indicates that there is strong 
evidence to support the notion that judges’ behavior is affected by the 
threat of a feasible challenger in a retention election.228  Moreover, the 
evidence shows that judicial politics affects racial groups in a disparate 
fashion.229  Incarceration rates rise disproportionately for black felons, 
evidenced by a 2.2 to 2.6 percent increase  during the election year; 
whereas white felons do not experience such an increase in incarceration 
rates.230  The evidence is parallel to a model that predicts that judges will 
engage in  discriminatory sentencing as a result of the electorate’s 
preference for racially disparate sentencing.231  Using proxies of district-
level prejudice, research indicates that “the increase in black 
incarceration rates are 2 to 4.5 times larger in districts associated with 
higher levels of predicted racial prejudice.”232  “These results speak 
directly to the existing debate on the merits of judicial accountability 
versus independence.”233  “While judicial elections increase policy 
congruence, policy congruence seems less palatable when the 
electorate’s ideal policy undermine fundamental democratic 
principles.”234 
In sum, these empirical studies conclude that judges’ sentencing 
decisions are affected by political pressures.  This supports the notion 
that recall has a chilling effect on an independent judiciary.  Judges 
should not conform to the will of the majority in fear of losing their 
position on the bench; which ultimately effects their ability to act 
impartially.235  Thus, because the exercise of judicial discretion is 
critical, “especially when it comes to sentencing, without discretion, we 
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are left with cookie cutter justice that imposes mandatory sentences 
without any regard to defendants’ circumstances.”236  The effects are far 
more damaging than the occasional ill-advised sentence.237  Mandatory 
sentencing has accomplished nothing, aside from mass incarceration of 
the poor and people of color.238   
The underlying logic of creating a CJP and similar commissions 
was to police the judiciary and to address citizens’ complaints pertaining 
to judge’s injudicious conduct.239  As exemplified by other states’ 
exclusion of trial court judges from recall, the findings from the 
empirical studies, and the CJP’s explanatory statement in the Persky 
investigation, recall is not an effective mechanism to police judges, and 
thus, should be eliminated from the California Constitution. 
V. PROPOSAL 
Subjecting trial court judges to recall will have an adverse effect on 
the criminal justice system, and the justice system generally. The 
California Legislature should amend the California Constitution by 
removing trial court judges from the list of local officials subject to 
recall.  Without an independent judiciary, judges will lose their 
discretion, thus bending towards the will of the majority when making 
sentencing decisions.  This practice results in the abolition of merciful 
sentencing, the implementation of mandatory minimums, and longer 
sentencing so as to appear tough on crime in order to remain in office.240  
Throughout history, these practices have primarily had a debilitating 
effect on the poor and people of color.241   
Removing a judge from office will not prevent crimes such as the 
sexual assault committed by Brock Turner.  Proponents of judicial recall 
somehow believe that by removing a judge, the criminal justice system 
will be restored and power will remain with the people.242  However, this 
is a fallacy.  History and empirical evidence indicate that we have never 
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had an equal criminal justice system.243  If judges lose their ability to 
remain impartial, courts will become extensions of the media, sentencing 
based upon public outrage rather than aggregating the totality of the 
circumstances and rendering a proper sentence under the law.244  
Abolishing California’s independent judiciary will nullify all progress 
that we have made towards reforming the criminal justice system.   
Further, commissions such as the CJP provide citizens with the 
ability and opportunity to police the judiciary.  The Legislature 
intentionally included citizens who are not and were never part of the 
legal field as members of the CJP, so as to safeguard against bias and 
preserve impartiality during investigations.245  Retention elections also 
serve as a tool for citizens to police the judiciary, because a judge who 
performs unsatisfactorily may be replaced at the end of his or her term 
in office.  Finally, impeachment is an adequate mechanism to police the 
judiciary, because an investigation is initiated when a judge is alleged to 
have committed a crime enumerated within the impeachment statute.   
Although an initiative is one option to resolve this problem, it is 
impracticable because of its high cost and the difficulty in messaging.246  
The implementation of my proposal is not substantially difficult.  
Because the California Legislature possesses the power to amend the 
constitution, I believe that it should amend the provision that expressly 
lists judges as local officials who are subject to recall.  Although 
Nevada’s constitutional provision creating the CJD sets out the only 
means by which judges may be removed, it is ambiguous and may be 
overturned in the future depending on the courts statutory analysis. 
California can avoid this pitfall and avoid any ambiguity by expressly 
stating that trial court judges are not subject to recall.  An example of the 
provision may look as such: A petition to recall a statewide officer must 
be signed by electors equal in number to twelve percent of the last vote 
for the office, with signatures from each of five counties equal in number 
to one percent of the last vote for the office in the county. Signatures to 
recall senators, members of the Assembly, members of the Board of 
Equalization; excluding judges of the supreme court, courts of appeal, 
and trial courts, must equal in number twenty percent of the last vote for 
the office.247 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the current mechanisms for policing judges are sufficient 
and eliminate the need for citizen recall.  State constitutions that do not 
possess provisions which allow the recall of judges have not shown the 
substantial deviation from justice that proponents of judicial recall claim 
will stem from abolishing this right.  Thus, the evidence demonstrates 
that the only outcome of leaving judicial recall intact is the abolishment 
of judicial independence and the nullification of all progress made by 
criminal justice system reformists.  Essentially, in regard to attaining an 
equal criminal justice system, proponents may win the fight at the 
detriment of losing the war. 
 
